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Civil Action No.:  1:11-cv-10007 
 
 
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S  
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
 
Defendant Laura Romo, M.D.’s (“Romo” or “Defendant”) Motion for Judgment as a 
Matter of Law (the “Motion”) requests that the Court  adopt an illogical interpretation of the 
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (the “SCA”), that does not comport with 
the relevant case law, the plain language of the statute, or the legislative intent in adopting the 
statute. The vast majority of courts addressing the issue of whether e-mail maintained by a web-
based service provider such as Yahoo! falls within the scope of the SCA have found that such 
e-mail accounts are covered by the SCA. Furthermore, common sense militates against reading a 
meaningless distinction into the SCA that would protect web-based e-mail from unauthorized 
access only if the unopened e-mails are accessed or the e-mail account holder downloads, copies 
or saves the subject e-mails in another location. Accordingly, Romo’s Motion should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Case Law Overwhelmingly Supports An Interpretation Of The  
SCA That Covers Dr. Cheng’s Yahoo! E-mail At Issue In This Case. 
 
 The majority of cases addressing the argument set forth by Romo in the Motion, 
including the Theofel case cited by Romo, have rejected the premise that previously opened e-
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mail maintained in an e-mail account is not in “electronic storage” for purposes of the SCA. See 
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (e-mail messages stored on an 
electronic communication service’s server are stored for “purposes of backup protection” within 
the ordinary meaning of those terms); Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2011 WL 5930469, at 
*6 (C.D.Ill. Nov. 29, 2011) (“a plain reading of the statute requires the conclusion that when 
communications are stored on an email provider’s server they are protected from unauthorized 
access under the SCA”); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F.Supp.2d 
548, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (the SCA  properly applies in situations where e-mail is viewed by a 
third-party after it has been delivered and viewed by an e-mail account holder); Cardinal Health 
414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F.Supp.2d 967, 976 n.2 (M.D.Tenn. 2008) (agreeing with Theofel that 
“an e-mail is in ‘electronic storage’ when it is waiting to be read and afterwards, and, therefore, 
intentionally reading an unauthorized e-mail, opened or not, is a violation of the [SCA]”); Bailey 
v. Bailey, No. 07-11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 (E.D.Mich. Feb. 6, 2008) (“the plain language 
of the statute seems to include emails received by the intended recipient where they remain 
stored by an electronic communication service”); see also Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 
Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining its holding in Theofel that “e-mail 
messages-which were stored on the [electronic communication service’s] server after delivery to 
the recipient-were ‘stored for purposes of backup protection’ . . . within the ordinary meaning of 
those terms” and apply that reasoning to defendant’s text messaging service); Fraser v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 2004) (expressing doubt that previously 
opened/received e-mails are “not in backup storage-a term that neither the statute nor the 
legislative history defines”). 
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004), the Court addressed the 
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defendant’s argument that “[e-mail] messages remaining on an ISP’s server after delivery no 
longer fall within the [SCA’s] coverage.” The defendant in Theofel argued, as Romo does here, 
that such e-mails are not “stored ‘for purposes of backup protection’” in accordance with the 
definition of “electronic storage” under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B), which is incorporated into the 
SCA through 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1), and therefore they do not fall within the scope of the SCA. 
The court, however, determined “that, within the ordinary meaning of those terms, [such e-mails] 
are [being stored for backup protection].” Id. at 1075. The court further explained “an obvious 
purpose for storing a message on an ISP’s server after delivery is to provide a second copy of the 
message in the event that the user needs to download it again if, for example, the message is 
accidentally erased from the user’s own computer. The ISP copy of the message functions as a 
‘backup’ for the user.”1 Id. 
 The Court in Bailey reached a similar conclusion. There, the defendant argued that the 
SCA did not apply to allegations that he accessed with ex-wife’s yahoo e-mail account without 
authorization “because the emails and messages he accessed were already opened by Plaintiff.” 
2008 WL 324156, at *5. After considering the same arguments Romo sets forth here, the Court 
determined that “[t]he fact that Plaintiff may have already read the emails and messages copied 
by Defendant does not take them out of the purview of the Stored Communications Act.” Id. at 
*6. The Court reasoned that “[t]he plain language of the statute seems to include emails received 
                                                 
1 The Theofel opinion contains confusing dicta that may be read to contradict the court’s holding and support 
Romo’s position, but that language has been discounted by subsequent decisions. Specifically, the court noted that 
“[a]n ISP that kept permanent copies of temporary messages could not fairly be described as ‘backing up’ those 
messages.” Id. at 1070. The Court, however, went on to give the following example of when a stored message would 
not be maintained for a backup purpose: “messages a user had flagged for deletion from the server.” Id. at 1076. 
Moreover, in Quon, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Theoful’s holding-that e-mail messages stored on NetGate’s 
server after delivery were for ‘backup protection,’ and that NetGate was undisputedly an ECS-forecloses 
[defendant’s] position. ” 529 F.3d at 902-03. 
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by the intended recipient where they remain stored by an electronic communication service.”2 Id. 
 As found in Theofel, Bailey, and other cases mentioned above, the plain language of the 
statute leads to the conclusion that e-mail in post-transmission storage falls within the scope of 
the SCA. This conclusion is consistent with the manner in which people use e-mail in today’s 
society and rests on a reasonable interpretation of the meaning of “backup protection” as used in 
the statute. E-mails are accessed from an electronic service provider’s server when a user logs 
into his or her e-mail account over the internet. The user reads his or her e-mail and, if the user 
decides to save an e-mail, he or she does not delete it and leaves the already opened e-mail 
message  in the e-mail account to store it. In other words, upon viewing an e-mail, the user 
makes a determination whether to delete that e-mail or leave a “backup” copy of that message in 
the account for later access. Because the SCA clearly applies to post-transmission e-mail 
maintained on electronic communication service’s server (there is no dispute that Yahoo! is an 
electronic communication service), the parties’ testimony regarding whether Romo read 
unopened e-mails in Cheng’s Yahoo! account or whether Cheng saved e-mails he received in his 
Yahoo! account in a separate location, is irrelevant. It is undisputed that Romo accessed e-mail 
stored in Cheng’s Yahoo! e-mail account and, therefore, the jury’s finding that Romo violated 
the SCA by doing so without authority or in excess of her authority was appropriate.  
 In arguing that the e-mail in Cheng’s Yahoo! e-mail account falls outside of the scope of 
the SCA, Romo relies on outlier cases and distinctions between the definition of an “electronic 
communication service” (“ECS”) and a “remote computing service” (“RCS”) that are not at issue 
with respect to Cheng’s claim. Cheng alleged that Romo violated § 2701(a) of the SCA. That 
                                                 
2 The Court also declined to read § 2510(17)(A) and § 2510(17)(B) as setting forth a singular definition of 
“electronic storage” because if that were intended “there would be no need to write them as two separate meanings.” 
Id. at *6; see also Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076 (finding that subsection (B) of § 2510(17) would be drained of 
independent content if it were read in conjunction with subsection (A)). 
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section does not mention RCS providers. It does cover ECS providers and Yahoo! clearly falls 
within the definition of an ECS, which § 2510(15) states “means any service which provides to 
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” Because Yahoo! 
is an ECS and § 2701(a) does not address RCS providers, any distinctions made between ECS 
and RCS providers in §§ 2702 and 2703, which concern voluntary disclosure of communications 
by service providers and disclosures requested by the government, respectively, are irrelevant.  
The district court’s decision in U.S. v. Weaver, 636 F.Supp.2d 769 (C.D.Ill. 2009), upon 
which Romo relies and which conflicts with the majority of decisions cited above, concerns an 
analysis of whether a Hotmail account is maintained by an ECS or RCS for purposes of a § 2703 
in connection with a government subpoena. Id. at 771. The Weaver decision distinguished 
Theofel based on the Ninth Circuit’s unstated “assumption that users download emails from an 
ISP’s server to their own computers” and is premised on the court’s unique interpretation of 
“storage for backup protection” such that it should be limited to e-mail that is saved in multiple 
locations. Id. at 772-73. The Weaver court’s interpretation of “backup protection” is inconsistent 
with the purposes of the SCA (which are discussed in detail below), does not square with the 
ordinary meaning of the term in the context of e-mail usage, and was reached in connection with 
an analysis of portions of the SCA that are not applicable here (i.e., § 2703). In fact, a number of 
courts that have analyzed § 2702 of the SCA in connection with civil subpoenas issued to ECS 
providers, including Yahoo! and Google, have held that e-mails stored by those entities are 
covered by the SCA without exception. See Bower v. Bower, 808 F.Supp.2d 348, 350 (D.Mass. 
2011) (“courts have repeatedly held that providers such as Yahoo! and Google may not produce 
emails in response to civil discovery subpoenas”); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 
550 F.Supp.2d 606, 611-12 (E.D.Va. 2008) (the “clear and unambiguous language” of the SCA 
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covers personal e-mails being stored electronically by AOL). The other cases cited by Romo 
should be rejected for reasons similar to the Weaver case. See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 
F.R.D. 346, 362-64 (E.D.Mich. 2008) (finding that a text messaging service provider that was no 
longer being used by the defendant was an RCS for purposes of § 2702 and that archived text 
messages received years before by the defendant were not being stored for backup protection); 
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 965, 987 (C.D.Cal. 2010) (following Weaver 
in finding that social networking sites are RCS providers for purposes § 2702 once messages 
have been opened by users).    
 B. The Legislative History of The SCA Shows That Dr. Cheng’s  
Yahoo! E-mail Was Protected by The Statute. 
 
Even assuming arguendo that the definition of “electronic storage” in the SCA is 
somehow ambiguous on the question of  previously opened e-mails stored in web-based e-mail 
accounts (which it is not), the legislative history of the statute confirms that Congress intended 
the SCA to protect such e-mails from unauthorized access. 
“Where the literal reading of a statutory term would ‘compel an odd result,’ . . . we must 
search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.” Public 
Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989)). “Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is 
perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems 
inconsistent with Congress’ intention, since the plain meaning rule is ‘rather an axiom of 
experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it 
exists.’” Id. at 455 (quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S., 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)). 
“‘[S]tatutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and 
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.’” Id. (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 
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148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)).  
The First Circuit engaged in an in depth discussion of the SCA’s legislative history in 
U.S. v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). Regarding the origin of the SCA, the Court 
observed: 
While drafting the [Electronic Communications Privacy Act’s] 
amendments to the Wiretap Act, Congress also recognized that, with the rise of 
remote computing operations and large databanks of stored electronic 
communications, threats to individual privacy extended well beyond the bounds 
of the Wiretap Act’s prohibition against the ‘interception’ of communications. 
These types of stored communications—including stored e-mail messages—were 
not protected by the Wiretap Act. Therefore, Congress concluded that ‘the 
information [in these communications] may be open to possible wrongful use and 
public disclosure by law enforcement authorities as well as unauthorized private 
parties.’ S.Rep. No. 99–541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 
3557. 
 
Congress added Title II to the ECPA [i.e., the Stored Communications 
Act] to halt these potential intrusions on individual privacy. 
 
Id. at 80-81. (Emphasis added.) 
The First Circuit further recognized that Congress’s definition of “electronic storage” in 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) is both “expansive” and “broad.” Id. at 73, 76 (citing U.S. v. Councilman, 
245 F.Supp.2d 319, 320 (D.Mass. 2003) (describing the definition of “electronic storage” as 
“extraordinarily indeed, almost breathtakingly broad”)). Prior to the ECPA adopting a broad 
definition of electronic storage, “e-mail messages retained on the service provider’s computers 
after transmission . . . could be accessed and possibly disclosed by the provider.” Id. at 77. The 
Court explained “the purpose of the broad definition of electronic storage was to enlarge privacy 
protections for stored data under the Wiretap Act, not to exclude e-mail messages stored during 
transmission from those strong protections.” Id. at 76. Additionally, “Congress sought to ensure 
that the messages and by-product files that are left behind after transmission, as well as messages 
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stored in a user’s mailbox, are protected from unauthorized access.” Id. at 77.3  
 In light of the legislative history of the SCA and the intended meaning of “electronic 
storage,” it is clear Congress intended to protect private e-mail messages, such as the e-mails in 
Cheng’s Yahoo! e-mail account, from unauthorized access by third-parties regardless of whether 
those e-mails were previously opened by the account holder or stored in a location other than the 
electronic communication service’s server. In Councilman, the First Circuit recounted how the 
SCA was specifically created “to halt [the] potential intrusions on individual privacy” related to 
stored electronic communications, including stored e-mail messages. Similarly, the Court in 
Councilman recognized how Congress intended a broad definition of “electronic storage” such 
that stored e-mail messages retained by a service provider would be covered by the statute. These 
interests would be subverted by the adoption of the interpretations of the SCA and the term 
“electronic storage” advocated by Romo, which limits the reach of the SCA to unopened e-mail 
messages and e-mail that is saved in two locations. That interpretation would not reach the vast 
majority of e-mail messages that exist in today’s society, i.e., previously opened e-mail messages 
stored in a web-based e-mail account, and would run counter to the statute’s purpose of 
providing protection from intrusions on individual privacy. 
C. Romo’s Proposed Construction Of The SCA Is Illogical. 
Neither Romo nor any of the decisions she relies on in her Motion explain or attempt to 
explain the rationale behind an interpretation of the SCA that covers only unopened e-mail or e-
                                                 
3 The legislative history also shows Congress was concerned about the amount information that is now “subject to 
control … of third party computer operator[s]” and as a result is “open to possible wrongful use and public 
disclosure by law enforcement authorities as well as unauthorized private parties.” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986). 
Congress observed that “if persons with records have a choice of maintaining them ‘in house’ or with a third party, 
they may be less inclined to go outside if such a move deprives them of legal rights.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 26 
(1986). Accordingly, Congress enacted the legislation with the “recognition that what is being protected is the 
sanctity and privacy of the communication.” 132 Cong. Rec. H4039-01 (June 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. 
Kastenmeir). 
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mail that has been downloaded, copied or saved separately from an electronic communication 
service. There is no logical reason why those categories of e-mail should be afforded greater 
privacy and be distinguished from e-mails that have been opened and stored only on the server of 
a web-based service provider. Such a distinction furthers no meaningful purpose, is illogical, is 
contrary to Congress’s intent in enacting the SCA, and is based on nothing more than a twisted 
interpretation of the SCA. Regardless, as was recognized in Theofel, Shefts, and Bailey, the plain 
meaning of the language of the SCA is that the statute applies to protect the privacy of all e-mail 
messages, open or unopened, that are stored with ECS providers. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Romo’s Motion should be denied. 
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